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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LET’S CALL IT WHAT IT IS: SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION IS SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII

INTRODUCTION
Greater protections for the LGBT+ 1 community are being recognized with
increasing frequency, especially after the Supreme Court’s June 2015 decision
in Obergefell v. Hodges that legalized same-sex marriage. 2 In direct contrast to
this trend, the Trump administration’s Department of Justice recently argued as
an amicus that employers could fire people for being gay, further arguing that
current employment discrimination statutes should not be interpreted to prohibit
sexual orientation discrimination. 3 The Justice Department’s argument could
significantly undermine the Supreme Court’s decision on marriage equality
because it conflicts with the judiciary’s increased protections for the LGBT+
community. 4 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has taken the
stance opposite the Department of Justice, arguing that LGBT+ employees
should be protected from discrimination under the existing law that prohibits
employees from being discriminated against on the basis of sex. 5
Fewer than half the states explicitly prohibit workplace discrimination
against LGBT+ workers. However, many states have enacted laws to explicitly
protect LGBT+ employees from workplace discrimination. 6 Accordingly, it is
clear that we cannot rely on state law alone to protect the LGBT+ community
from adverse employment actions in the workplace. Additionally, one survey
indicated that seventy-six percent of the adult population believed it should be
1. The author acknowledges that there are many terms used to refer to the diverse
categorizations of non-heterosexual and non-cisgender individuals. “LGBT+” is used here to
include all constituencies identifying as non-heterosexual and non-cisgender.
2. 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. Chris Riotta, Trump Administration Says Employers Can Fire People for Being Gay,
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 28, 2017, 3:56 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-doj-fired-being-gay-lgbt
-issues-jeff-sessions-673398 [https://perma.cc/NW6B-4NLP]; Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees at 1, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d
100 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 15-3775), 2017 WL 3277292.
4. Riotta, supra note 3.
5. What You Should Know about EEOC and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforce
ment_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm [https://perma.cc/7TQC-XHFE] (last visited Nov. 8, 2018).
6. Currently, twenty-two states protect employees in both the private and the public sector
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while ten states protect only public
employees from such discrimination. In Your State, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.
org/states-regions/in-your-state [https://perma.cc/2G5R-YFNC] (last visited Nov. 8, 2018).
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illegal to discriminate against LGBT+ individuals in the workplace, while sixtytwo percent of the population believes it is already illegal to discriminate against
LGBT+ individuals in the workplace. 7
Despite these beliefs, there is actually no federal law that explicitly protects
this group of individuals. Many argue that sexual orientation should be covered
under Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination. 8 While “sex” refers to the
male or female status assigned at birth, 9 sex discrimination has been interpreted
as encompassing discrimination based on gender as well. 10 Gender means “the
attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that a given culture associates with a person’s
biological sex.” 11 Behaviors that are viewed as incompatible with these
expectations constitute gender nonconformity. 12 The Supreme Court ruled three
decades ago that employees who experience discrimination based on gender
nonconformity are protected under Title VII. 13 This precedent has led courts to
apply Title VII’s protections to LGBT+ plaintiffs whose dress, appearance, or
mannerisms are gender nonconforming. 14 However, many courts are struggling
to interpret Title VII’s protections as extending to the LGBT+ community in the
workplace when obvious gender nonconformity is absent. 15 On the other hand,
as this Article will discuss more fully below, courts are also struggling to explain
why sexual orientation discrimination is not inherently sex discrimination. 16
After all, gay and lesbian employees by their very nature violate traditional

7. Peter Moore, Poll Results: Discrimination, YOUGOV (June 18, 2014, 2:56 PM),
https://today.yougov.com/topics/legal/articles-reports/2014/06/18/poll-results-discrimination
[https://perma.cc/HA3P-XB77].
8. Id.
9. Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and
Gender Nonconforming People, 70 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 832, 862 (2015), http://www.apa.org/prac
tice/guidelines/transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/37X3-F825].
10. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
11. Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Lesbian, Gay, and
Bisexual Clients, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 10, 11 (2012), http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/features
/amp-a0024659.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W25-8E7F]. The word “gender” has come to be used
synonymously with the word “sex” in the law of discrimination. Mary Ann Case, Disaggregating
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1995).
12. Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 11, at 11.
13. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–51.
14. See, e.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 457 (5th Cir. 2013); Lewis v.
Heartland Inns, 591 F.3d 1033, 1042 (8th Cir. 2010); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d
864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001).
15. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n., 432 F. App’x 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011); Dawson
v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2005); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc.,
332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003).
16. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (arguing that
finding for the plaintiff would have the effect of de facto amending Title VII to encompass sexual
orientation discrimination).
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gender norms just by being attracted to others of the same sex. 17 These
conflicting interpretations of sexual orientation discrimination have created a
split among the federal courts of appeals, resulting in some LGBT+ plaintiffs
receiving protection while others receive no protection.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPLIT
Despite growing support for LGBT+ rights today, this has not always been
the case. From 1973 until the early 1990s, seventy to seventy-five percent of
American adults believed that homosexuality was “always wrong.” 18 This was
due, in large part, to the impact of the AIDS epidemic on attitudes towards
homosexuality. 19 Homosexuality was even classified as a mental disorder in the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (“DSM”) until 1974. 20 It is no surprise, therefore, that courts did not
initially interpret LGBT+ individuals as belonging to a protected class under
employment law statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”).
TITLE VII
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or to discriminate with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or other privileges of employment because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 21 Title VII also makes it unlawful to limit,

17. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017).
18. Gregory B. Lewis & Marc A. Rogers, Does the Public Support Equal Employment Rights
for Gays and Lesbians?, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: PUBLIC POLICY,
PUBLIC OPINION, AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 118, 119–20 (Ellen D. B. Riggle & Barry L.
Tadlock eds., 1999); Jeni Loftus, America’s Liberalization in Attitudes Toward Homosexuality,
1973 to 1998, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 762, 767 (2001); TOM W. SMITH, NAT’L OPINION RES. CTR.,
ATTITUDES TOWARDS SEXUAL PERMISSIVENESS: TRENDS, CORRELATES, AND BEHAVIORAL
CONNECTIONS 3 (1992); Alan S. Yang, The Polls—Trends: Attitudes Towards Homosexuality, 61
PUB. OPINION Q., 477, 484–85 (1997); ALAN S. YANG, THE 2000 NATIONAL ELECTIONS STUDY
AND GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS: SUPPORT FOR EQUALITY GROWS 6 (2001).
19. Loftus, supra note 18, at 779; Jacqueline Scott, Changing Attitudes to Sexual Morality: A
Cross-National Comparison, 32 SOCIOLOGY, 815, 820 (1998).
20. Position Statement (Retired), Am. Psychological Ass’n, Homosexuality and Sexual
Orientation Disturbance: Proposed Change in DSM-II, 6th Printing, Page 44, APA Document
Reference No. 730008 (1973), https://dsm.psychiatryonline.org/doi/pdf/10.1176/appi.books.9780
890420362.dsm-ii-6thprintingchange [https://perma.cc/YB85-5JS9]. Homosexual individuals
were not the only group targeted by negative public opinion. In 1980, transgender people were
officially classified by the American Psychiatric Association as having “gender identity disorder,”
leading society to believe that transgenderism was something that needed to be cured. See Susan
Stryker, Transgender Activism, GLBTQ 4 (2015) http://www.glbtqarchive.com/ssh/transgender_
activism_S.pdf [https://perma.cc/KDS6-MZEX].
21. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
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segregate, or classify employees or applicants in a way that would deprive them
of employment opportunities or that would adversely affect their employment
status. 22 Although sexual orientation and gender identity are not explicitly listed
as classes protected by Title VII, the statute’s sex discrimination provision could
encompass these types of discrimination.
EARLY CASES
While today the courts distinguish between gender identity and sexual
orientation as separate aspects of sexuality, early decisions cached the constructs
together under a general “sexual preference” umbrella. 23 Therefore, the earliest
cases that attempted to broaden the scope of Title VII to include LGBT+ as a
protected class under the “sex” prong of the statute focused on what is now
labeled “gender identity”-based discrimination. Holloway was the first to
address the issue of whether a transsexual 24 employee could claim Title VII
discrimination on the basis of sex. In Holloway, the plaintiff began female
hormone treatments shortly after she began employment with Arthur Andersen
& Co. in 1969. 25 Four years later, she was promoted and decided to inform her
supervisor that she was undergoing treatment in preparation for anatomical sex
change surgery. 26 Despite informing the plaintiff that she may be more
comfortable working at a company where her sex assigned at birth was
unknown, Holloway’s supervisor gave her a pay raise. 27 However, Holloway
was terminated shortly afterward when she requested that her records be
changed to reflect her updated first name. 28 The court was hard-pressed to look
beyond the explicit text of Title VII, arguing that Congress had only the

22. Id.
23. This outlook is consistent with the public’s lack of understanding of the difference between
the terms “sex” and “gender” in the 1950s to the 1970s, as well as leaders’ and organizers’ struggle
to address the different concerns and identity issues of gay men, women identifying as lesbians,
and others identifying as gender variant or nonbinary. See generally Milton Diamond, Sex, Gender,
and Identity over the Years: A Changing Perspective, 13 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC
CLINICS OF N. AM. 591 (2004); Bonnie Morris, History of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgender Social Movements, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/re
sources/history.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y8YU-GTPH] (last visited Nov. 8, 2018).
24. The term “transsexual” is used in this section because this represents the explicit language
used by the courts during this time period. “Transsexual” is now considered an older term and is
preferred by some people who have permanently changed, or who seek to change, their bodies
through medical interventions such as hormones and/or surgeries. GLAAD Media Reference Guide
– Transgender, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender [https://perma.cc/XH4R2HJG] (last visited Nov. 8, 2018).
25. Holloway v. Arthur & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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traditional notions of “sex” in mind when the statute was enacted. 29 The court
justified its reasoning by stating that several bills had been introduced to amend
the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination against “sexual preference,” but
that none had been enacted into law. 30 As a result, the court refused to extend
Title VII’s application in the absence of further Congressional action. 31
Around the same time that Holloway was decided, LGBT+ plaintiffs
attempting to find relief for discrimination based on their sexual orientation
under Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition were equally unsuccessful. In
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the employer refused to hire a male
employee because he was “effeminate.” 32 Smith argued that Title VII forbids an
employer to reject a job applicant based on his or her affectional or sexual
preference, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed, refusing to extend Title VII’s
prohibition of sex discrimination without a further Congressional mandate
explicitly protecting sexual preference. 33
One year later, the Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of Smith in DeSantis
v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. 34 DeSantis encompassed three separate
federal district court actions claiming that employers had discriminated against
plaintiffs because of their homosexuality. 35 Consistent with other circuits’
attention to the explicit language of the statute, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Congress had only the traditional notions of “sex” in mind. 36 Therefore, it
refused to expand Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination to discrimination
based on sexual orientation. 37
Six years later, there was a brief glimmer of hope for the transsexual
community when the Northern District of Illinois found for a transsexual
plaintiff under Title VII. 38 In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff, a
Vietnam war veteran and licensed pilot, was fired by Eastern Airlines after she
returned to work following sex reassignment surgery. 39 The district court
determined that the definition of “sex” extends beyond the traditional malefemale dichotomy and also includes questions of one’s own self-perception, as
well as society’s perception of the individual. 40 Judge Grady went on to state
that “sex is not a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes . . . the term, ‘sex,’ . . .
29. Id. at 662.
30. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
31. Id. at 663.
32. 569 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1978).
33. Id. at 326–27.
34. DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979).
35. Id. at 328.
36. Id. at 329.
37. Id.
38. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 840 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d, 742 F.2d 1081
(7th Cir. 1984).
39. Id. at 827.
40. Id. at 823.
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can be and should be reasonably interpreted to include among its denotations the
question of sexual identity,” thereby providing Title VII protections to
transsexuals. 41 Consequently, the district court held that regardless of whether
Ulane was regarded as a transsexual or as a female, she was discharged by
Eastern Airlines because of her sex in violation of Title VII. 42 However, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, applying similar analysis to that
utilized by the Ninth Circuit in Holloway—refusing to define sex in any way
other than the rudimentary male-female dichotomy. 43 Specifically, the court
stated that the words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person
who has a sexual identity disorder, and that a prohibition against discrimination
based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with a prohibition based on an
individual’s sexual identity disorder or discountenance with the sex into which
they were born. 44 The court stated that “even if one believes that a woman can
be so easily created from what remains of a man, that does not decide this case”
because Ulane was discriminated against for her transsexual status rather than
for being female. 45
Courts relied exclusively on this narrow interpretation of Title VII
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, by the late 1980s, courts began to
apply the theory of sex stereotyping as evidence that discrimination against
LGBT+ employees was sex discrimination, reasoning that because LGBT+
people may fail to conform to what society’s gender norms would dictate is
appropriate, their discrimination was sex discrimination prohibited under Title
VII.
SEX STEREOTYPES AND SUPREME COURT ACTION
In 1989, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, first accepted sex
stereotyping as discrimination under Title VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 46
Ann Hopkins worked at Price Waterhouse’s Office of Government Services for
five years when the partners in her office proposed her as a candidate for
partnership—the only woman out of eighty-eight other employees proposed for
partnership that year. 47 Some of the partners reacted negatively to Hopkins,
describing her as “macho,” “overcompensat[ing] for being a woman,” and

41. Id. at 825.
42. Id. at 840.
43. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1087. This further demonstrates the negative attitudes towards transsexuals during
this time period. See generally Diamond, supra note 23.
46. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion) superseded in part by statute on other
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012), as recognized in
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 & n.4 (2014).
47. Id. at 233.
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needing a “course at charm school.” 48 When Hopkins’s candidacy for partner
was placed on hold, she was advised to “walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry.” 49 A plurality of the Court concluded that Congress’ intent to forbid
employers from taking gender into account in making employment decisions
appears on the face of the statute, and that “common sense” should not be left at
the doorstep when interpreting the statute. 50 The plurality further stated that in
the context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief
that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the
basis of gender. 51 In other words, the plurality opinion expanded the meaning of
sex discrimination beyond the narrow, strictly biological definition of Title VII’s
sex discrimination prohibition and interpreted the statute to strike at the “entire
spectrum” of disparate treatment of men and woman resulting from sex
stereotypes. 52
When an employee’s appearance or actions are perceived to be gender
nonconforming and serve as the basis for an adverse employment action, this
discrimination consistently falls under the Price Waterhouse reasoning and is
prohibited under Title VII. For instance, the Eighth Circuit used a sex
stereotyping theory to find for the plaintiff under Title VII in Lewis v. Heartland
Inns when Brenna Lewis was deemed not a “good fit” for the front desk, despite
receiving positive reviews from her managers and customers. 53 Her supervisor’s
stated reasons included that Lewis’ appearance was “slightly more masculine”
and that she had an “Ellen DeGeneres kind of look” and lacked the “Midwestern
girl look.” 54 Quoting Price Waterhouse, the Eighth Circuit concluded that “we
are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group.” 55
Sex stereotyping theories have also been used as a basis for sex
discrimination in cases where the plaintiff is berated for exhibiting gender
nonconformity. For example, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,
the plaintiff, a server at one of the defendant’s restaurants, was subjected to a
relentless campaign of insults, name-calling, and vulgarities about his feminine

48. Id. at 235.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 239, 241.
51. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion).
52. Id. at 251. The Price Waterhouse decision has not only applied to cases to cases of sexual
orientation discrimination, but also to cases involving gender identity. See Smith v. City of Salem,
378 F.3d 566, 567–68 (6th Cir. 2004); EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d
560, 572 (6th Cir. 2018).
53. 591 F.3d 1033, 1035–36 (8th Cir. 2010).
54. Id. at 1036.
55. Id. at 1042 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251).
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appearance. 56 Male coworkers and a supervisor repeatedly referred to the
plaintiff using the pronouns “she” and “her” and mocked him for walking and
carrying his serving tray “like a woman.” 57 The Ninth Circuit held that this
verbal abuse occurred because of sex, and applied the Price Waterhouse logic
found in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., that “just as a woman can
ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did
not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim on
evidence that other men discriminated against him because he did not meet
stereotyped expectations of masculinity.” 58
In a similar set of circumstances, the Fifth Circuit found in EEOC v. Boh
Brothers Construction Company that the plaintiff, Woods, was protected under
Title VII when his coworkers referred to him with demeaning and vulgar
language, such as “princess” and “faggot.” 59 In addition to verbal comments,
Woods’ coworkers also took physical actions, such as approaching Woods from
behind and simulating intercourse with him. 60 The court reasoned that there was
enough evidence to support the conclusion that Woods’ harassment was because
of sex. 61 Specifically, Woods’ coworkers thought that Woods was not a “manlyenough man,” and this perception and associated harassment were sufficient to
support a Title VII sex discrimination claim on the basis of gender
nonconformity. 62
In other cases, courts have failed to find for employees when an employee’s
discrimination was strictly on the basis of sexual orientation stereotypes as
opposed to sex stereotypes. Although there is substantial overlap between sexual
orientation and gender nonconformity claims, courts have found that certain
aspects of a worker’s sexual orientation may create a target for discrimination
apart from any issues related to gender. 63 Discrimination may be based on
prejudicial or stereotypical ideas about the gay and lesbian lifestyle, such as
promiscuity, religious beliefs, spending habits, child rearing, sexual practices,
or politics. 64 For instance, in Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., Hamm
was called a “faggot,” “bisexual,” and “girl scout,” and a coworker threatened
to snap his neck. 65 Another coworker threatened to “shove [a] water hose up
[Hamm’s] ass,” and Hamm stated that management believed he was “that

56. 256 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2001).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 874 (quoting Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st
Cir. 1999)).
59. 731 F.3d 444, 449, 478 (5th Cir. 2013).
60. Id. at 449.
61. Id. at 457.
62. Id.
63. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2016).
64. Id.
65. 332 F.3d 1058, 1060 (7th Cir. 2003).
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way.” 66 The court found that even after drawing all reasonable inference in
Hamm’s favor, his experiences were either related to his coworkers’ disapproval
of his work performance or their perceptions of Hamm’s sexual orientation,
neither of which fit under the protection of sex discrimination based on gender
nonconformity. 67
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Dawson v. Bumble &
Bumble. 68 Dawson was a self-described lesbian female who did not conform to
gender norms or meet the stereotyped expectations of femininity. 69 At the hair
salon in which she worked, fellow stylists would harass her about her appearance
and the fact that she did not conform to the image of a woman, often calling her
“Donald” and joking that she was “wearing her sexuality like a costume.” 70 The
court concluded that Dawson’s claims of sex stereotyping did not in fact derive
from sex stereotypes, but rather from stereotypes based on sexual orientation,
and therefore were not cognizable under Title VII. 71
The same reasoning was used six years later in the Sixth Circuit’s decision
in Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n. 72 Gilbert, who worked for the Country Music
Association was openly homosexual. 73 While preparing for a show, a union
worker called him a “faggot” and threatened to stab him. 74 The particular worker
in question was even facing criminal charges for having stabbed several
homosexuals elsewhere. 75 Gilbert attempted to raise a claim of sex
discrimination under the theory of gender nonconformity, but the court labeled
this as a “formulaic recitation” of the elements of a sex stereotyping cause of
action, which by itself would not rise to the level of protection under Title VII. 76
Instead, the court determined that Gilbert’s allegations involved “discrimination
based on sexual orientation, nothing more.” 77
Price Waterhouse and the cases that followed demonstrated that gender
nonconformity can serve as a basis for sex discrimination when an employee
faces discrimination on the basis of obvious gender nonconformity, but not when
an employee fails to display gender nonconforming behaviors or when
discrimination arises primarily on the basis of sexual orientation stereotypes. In
other words, employees who experienced discrimination based on apparent

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1062.
398 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 213.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 216.
432 F. App’x 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 518.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 520.
Gilbert, 432 F. App’x at 520.
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gender nonconforming behaviors may be successful on their Title VII sex
discrimination claim, whereas those who experience discrimination as a result
of purely being homosexual would not. After Price Waterhouse and subsequent
cases set the standard for sex stereotyping as a theory of sex discrimination under
Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”)
published its interpretation of Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition as
applied to cases of gender identity and sexual orientation, and some courts
ultimately responded by adopting the agency’s position.
EEOC GUIDELINES
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is an administrative
agency responsible for the enforcement of Title VII and various other
employment discrimination statutes. 78 While the EEOC cannot issue regulations
under Title VII with the force of law, it is authorized to issue interpretive or
procedural guidance on how employers should comply with the laws it
enforces. 79 However, there is some evidence that the Supreme Court defers to
the EEOC less frequently than other federal agencies. 80 In addition to publishing
interpretive guidance, the EEOC also adjudicates appeals from administrative
decisions made by federal agencies on EEOC complaints. 81
The EEOC interprets and enforces Title VII’s prohibition of sex
discrimination as forbidding employment discrimination based on gender
identity or sexual orientation, even if allowed by state or local laws. 82 The EEOC
explicitly states that it has not recognized any new protected characteristics
under Title VII. 83 Rather, the Commission has applied existing Title VII
precedents to sex discrimination claims raised by LGBT+ individuals,
interpreting the statute’s sex discrimination provision as prohibiting
discrimination against employees on the basis of sexual orientation and gender

78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012) (enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-4, e-5, e-12). See also Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 209, 211, 213, 215–19, 255–56,
259–60, 262 (2012); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012)
(enforcement authority codified at 29 U.S.C. § 628); Americans with Disabilities Act, tit. 1, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2012) (enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12117); Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 §§ 501, 505, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794, 794a (2012) (enforcement authority codified at
29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(1)).
79. Theodore W. Wern, Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights
Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J., 1533, 1552
(1999).
80. The Supreme Court deferred to the EEOC’s view fifty-four percent of the time, compared
to seventy-two percent of the time for other federal agencies. Id. at 1549–50.
81. About EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
[https://perma.cc/2Y4X-YTLF] (last visited Nov. 9, 2018).
82. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 5.
83. Id.
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identity. 84 The EEOC has ruled in favor of plaintiffs in cases of both transgender
discrimination 85 and sexual orientation discrimination 86 on the basis, namely,
that claims of discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation
necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII. 87
This paper focuses on sexual orientation discrimination specifically because “a
person is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or
her behavior transgresses gender stereotypes.” 88 Thus, while there is a
congruence between discriminating against transgender individuals and
discrimination on the basis of gender-based behavioral norms, 89 this overlap is
not necessarily as apparent or consistent for gay and lesbian individuals. 90 This
lack of overlap has resulted in inconsistently applied law for gay and lesbian
employees in particular.
As the cases and EEOC Guidelines above illustrate, there is a consistency
among the circuits in finding for plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claims when
issues of gender nonconformity and sex stereotyping are involved. However,
circuits disagree on the extension of Title VII’s protections when the case
involves stereotypes based purely on sexual orientation as opposed to sex.
SEXUAL ORIENTATION
While LGBT+ plaintiffs could bring claims as sex stereotyping cases, the
cases were routinely dismissed if the claims were actually sexual orientation
discrimination claims. In other words, courts were unwilling to extend Title
VII’s sex discrimination prohibition to cover sexual orientation discrimination
per se. Simonton v. Runyon is one such case. 91 Simonton, a known homosexual
male employee of the United States Postal Service, endured a series of explicit
and indecent verbal assaults from coworkers. 92 Notes were placed on the wall in
the employees’ bathroom with Simonton’s name and the name of celebrities who
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Lusardi v. McHugh, EEOC Decision No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756 (April
1, 2015); Eric S. v. Shinseki, EEOC Decision No. 0120133123, 2014 WL 1653484 (Apr. 16, 2014);
Jameson v. Donahoe, EEOC Decision No. 0120130992, 2013 WL 2368729 (May 21, 2013); Macy
v. Holder, EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (April 20, 2012).
86. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (July 15,
2015).
87. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 5.
88. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011).
89. Id.; EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 576 (6th Cir. 2018)
(“[A]n employer cannot discriminate on the basis of transgender status without imposing its
stereotypical notions of how sexual organs and gender identity ought to align.”).
90. See Case, supra note 11, at 57 (“Feminine gender in men and gay male sexual orientation
are far from perfectly overlapping categories, there are effeminate men who are not gay as well as
gay men who are not effeminate.”).
91. 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).
92. Id. at 34–35.
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had died of AIDS. 93 In addition, pornographic photographs were taped to his
work area, male dolls were placed in his vehicle, and copies of Playgirl magazine
were sent to his home. 94 Simonton’s coworkers also hung posters that stated that
Simonton suffered from a mental illness. 95 Despite the extreme discrimination
Simonton faced, the Second Circuit reasoned that Congress’s refusal to expand
the reach of Title VII is strong evidence of congressional intent in the face of
consistent judicial decisions refusing to interpret “sex” to include sexual
orientation. 96 The court further stated that “sex” under Title VII can logically
only refer to “membership in a class delineated by gender, rather than sexual
activity regardless of gender.” 97 The court admitted that Simonton may have
found relief under Title VII under a sex stereotyping theory, but that they did
not have a basis in the record to surmise that Simonton behaved in a
stereotypically feminine manner and that the discrimination he experienced was,
in fact, based on his nonconformity with gender norms instead of his sexual
orientation. 98
In an attempt to further distinguish between gender and sexual activity, the
Sixth Circuit refused to find for an employee who faced discrimination as a
result of his association with another employee at work. In Vickers v. Fairfield
Medical Center, the male plaintiff befriended a homosexual male doctor. 99 Once
his coworkers found out about the friendship, they began to make sexually based
slurs and discriminating comments about Vickers, alleging that he was gay and
questioning his masculinity. 100 Fellow employees also placed chemicals in
Vickers’ food, called him vulgar nicknames, and repeatedly grabbed his crotch
with a tape measure, among other obscene behaviors. 101 The court did not extend
Price Waterhouse’s gender nonconformity theory to Vickers because the
harassment arose based on Vickers’ perceived homosexuality and friendship
with a known homosexual man as opposed to gender nonconforming behaviors
observed at work. 102 The dissent asserted that the majority made an artificial
distinction between behavior and appearances in the workplace and private

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
1986)).
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35.
Id. at 36 (quoting DeCintio v. Westchester Cty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306–07 (2d Cir.
Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38.
453 F.3d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 759–60.
Id. at 763.
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conduct, arguably because they could not distinguish between sexual orientation
discrimination and sex discrimination. 103
Courts have also refused to allow sex stereotyping theories to serve as a
basis for Title VII discrimination for employees who are openly homosexual. In
Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, Evans worked at a hospital as a security
officer for over a year until she left voluntarily. 104 While working at the hospital,
Evans was denied equal pay or work, harassed, and physically assaulted and
battered. 105 Before leaving voluntarily, she was targeted for termination for not
carrying herself in a “traditional womanly manner.” 106 Although she did not
broadcast her sexuality, it was “evident” because of how she presented herself
(having a male uniform, low male haircut, shoes, etc.). 107 Evans asserted that her
status as a lesbian supported her claim of sex discrimination because
discrimination against someone for her orientation often coincided with
discrimination for gender nonconformity. 108 The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that Evans did not provide enough facts to suggest that her decision to present
herself in a masculine manner led to the adverse employment actions, and it
refused to find for Evans on her sexual orientation discrimination claim without
sufficient gender nonconformity evidence as consistent with other circuits. 109
Throughout the beginning of 2017, courts reverted to an essentially prePrice Waterhouse interpretation of Title VII, relying heavily on the narrow
interpretations of “sex” in the statute in failing to interpret its protections as
extending to sexual orientation discrimination. However, this interpretation
changed and broadened once again in the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Hively in
April 2017.
THE IMPACT OF HIVELY
Kimberly Hively began teaching as a part-time adjunct professor at Ivy Tech
Community College in 2000. 110 Although Hively met the necessary
qualifications for full-time employment and had never received a negative
103. Id. at 766–70 (Lawson, J., dissenting). The majority in Vickers expressed a concern that
finding for Vickers would “have the effect of de facto amending Title VII to encompass sexual
orientation as a prohibited basis for discrimination.” Vickers, 453 F.3d at 764.
104. 850 F.3d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 2017).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1254.
109. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1254, 1256. On September 7, 2017, Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United
States on behalf of Jameka Evans, urging the Supreme Court to interpret Title VII’s ban on sex
discrimination broadly as extending to LGBT+ employees. Certiorari was denied on December 11,
2017, leaving the split unresolved. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8–14, Evans v. Ga. Reg’l
Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied. 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017).
110. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2016).
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performance evaluation, the college refused to interview her for any of the six
full-time positions for which she applied between 2009 and 2014. 111
Furthermore, her part-time employment contract was not renewed in 2014. 112
Hively alleged that she had been “denied full-time employment and promotions
based on her sexual orientation,” which she argued violated Title VII. 113 The
college, in turn, argued that Title VII does not apply to claims of sexual
orientation discrimination and that Hively was therefore not entitled to any legal
remedy. 114 The court sided with the employer, citing a body of Seventh Circuit
precedent binding their decision. 115 Interestingly, the court even cited the prePrice Waterhouse Seventh Circuit Ulane case, returning to the plain meaning of
the word “sex” as encompassing discrimination against women only because
they are women and against men only because they are men. 116 Despite
acknowledging that “it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish between [claims
of gender nonconformity and claims of sexual orientation],” the court ultimately
concluded that it is not impossible and that there may indeed be some aspects of
a worker’s sexual orientation that create a target for discrimination apart from
any issues related to gender. 117 Because Hively only alleged discrimination
based on sexual orientation, the court was bound by its prior precedent in
interpreting Title VII as encompassing her discrimination claim in the absence
of a Supreme Court opinion or new legislation. 118
Although it appeared at first that the Seventh Circuit was going to rule in
accordance with its own prior precedent in limiting the scope of Title VII claims
only to those that sufficiently plead gender nonconformity and sex stereotyping,
the plaintiff’s petition for rehearing en banc was granted, and the Seventh Circuit
gathered one year later to review the 2016 panel decision. 119 The en banc opinion
used the panel’s acknowledgement of the difficulty in separating gender

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Hively, 830 F.3d at 700–01 (citing Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.,
224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir.
2000) (both holding that harassment based solely upon a person’s sexual preference or orientation,
and not one’s sex, is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII); Muhammed v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 767 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing the holding in Spearman, 231 F.3d at
1085); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003) (Refusing
to extend Title VII’s protections to claims of harassment based on an individual’s sexual
orientation); Shroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (Holding that Title
VII does not provide for a private right of action based on sexual orientation discrimination)).
116. Hively, 830 F.3d at 700 (citing Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th
Cir. 1984)).
117. Hively, 830 F.3d at 705, 709.
118. Id. at 718.
119. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
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nonconformity claims from sexual orientation claims to conclude that sexual
orientation claims fall within Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination
if the claim affects employment in one of the statutorily specified ways. 120 In
justifying this reasoning, the court concluded that the discriminatory behavior
does not exist without taking the victim’s biological sex into account. 121 The
court stated that “[a]ny discomfort, disapproval, or job decision based on the fact
that the complainant— woman or man— dresses differently, speaks differently,
or dates or marries a same-sex partner, is a reaction purely and simply based on
sex.” 122 In other words, the court believed that “Hively represents the ultimate
case of failure to conform to the female stereotype (at least as understood in a
place such as modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and
other forms of sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual.” 123
Hively was a groundbreaking ruling for LGBT+ employees as the first case
that acknowledged that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination.
One year after Hively was decided, the Second Circuit followed the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning when it decided Zarda v. Altitude Express. 124 In Zarda,
Donald Zarda was a homosexual man working for Altitude Express, a skydiving
company. 125 Zarda typically informed female customers that he was homosexual
so that they would feel more comfortable when they were strapped closely to
him while skydiving. 126 However, when a male customer found out about
Zarda’s disclosure of his homosexuality to his girlfriend, the male customer
called Altitude Express and complained about Zarda’s behavior. 127 Zarda was
subsequently fired, allegedly for failing to provide an enjoyable experience for
a customer. 128 Zarda attempted to make a sex stereotyping claim by arguing that
his employer criticized him for wearing pink clothes and nail polish at work. 129
The district court concluded that Zarda failed to establish the “requisite
proximity” between his termination and his proffered instances of gender
nonconformity and granted summary judgment on Zarda’s Title VII claim,
following the precedent set by Simonton on failing to recognize sexual
orientation discrimination claims in and of themselves under Title VII. 130 The
Second Circuit did not reanalyze this issue on appeal, as it was not alleged by

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 342, 347.
Id. at 347.
Id.
Id. at 346.
855 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 80.
Id.
Id.
Zarda, 855 F.3d at 81.
Id.
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Zarda. 131 Thus, Zarda could only receive a new trial if Title VII’s prohibition of
sex discrimination encompassed discrimination based on sexual orientation – a
result foreclosed by Simonton. 132
While the Second Circuit panel could not overrule prior precedent, the court
granted a rehearing en banc in February 2018 and subsequently did overrule
Simonton. 133 Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit articulated three theories
outlined in the EEOC’s decision in Baldwin to explain why sexual orientation is
sex discrimination. 134 First, sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination
because of sex because sexual orientation is defined with explicit reference to
sex. 135 In fact, sexual orientation is doubly delineated by sex because it is
defined by both a person’s sex and the sex of those to whom he or she is
attracted. 136 “[B]ecause sexual orientation is a function of sex and sex is a
protected characteristic under Title VII, it follows that sexual orientation is also
protected.” 137 Second, it is “simply impossible” to disentangle sexual orientation
from sex because beliefs about sexual orientation necessarily take sex into
consideration. 138 Therefore, it makes no difference that the employer may not
believe that its actions are based on sex. 139 Finally, sexual orientation
discrimination is a form of associational discrimination. 140 “[I]f a male
employee married to a man is terminated because his employer disapproves of
the same-sex marriage, the employee has suffered associational discrimination
based on his own sex because ‘the fact that the employee is a man instead of a
woman motivated the employer’s discrimination against him.’” 141 Based on this
reasoning, the Second Circuit concluded that Zarda was entitled to bring a Title
VII claim for discrimination based on sexual orientation and remanded the case
for further proceedings. 142
131. Id. at 82.
132. Id.
133. Zarda v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100, 110, 121 (2nd Cir. 2018) (en banc).
134. Id. at 113–28; Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641
(July 15, 2015).
135. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113. For instance, a lesbian employee who faces an adverse
employment action for displaying a picture of her female spouse can allege discrimination if a male
employee does not experience an adverse employment action for displaying a picture of his female
spouse. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 5 (discussing Baldwin, 2015 WL
4397641).
136. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 122.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 124. An employee who alleges sexual orientation discrimination is alleging that the
employer took the employee’s sex into account by treating him or her differently for associating
with a person of the same sex. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 5.
141. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 125 (quoting Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015
WL 4397641, at *6 (July 15, 2015)).
142. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 132.
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The en banc rulings in Hively and Zarda were celebrated wins for the
LGBT+ community, 143 but the rulings are not the “be all and end all” of sexual
orientation discrimination claims under Title VII. Courts outside the Seventh
and Second Circuits are still free to limit the scope of Title VII’s sex
discrimination prohibition to include only purely sex-based discrimination and
discrimination under theories of sex stereotyping. In other words, an
interpretation gap remains between the Seventh and Second Circuits on one end
and the remaining circuits on the other.
THE REMAINING GAP
Hively—and subsequently Zarda—broadened Title VII’s sex discrimination
prohibition further than any other court had in the past by interpreting it to
encompass sexual orientation-based discrimination claims— even without
framing the case as a sex stereotyping case. However, this does not mean that
LGBT+ employees in other circuits are protected against discrimination under
Title VII. Instead, plaintiffs in these jurisdictions must sufficiently plead their
LGBT+ discrimination claims as falling under the theory of sex stereotyping in
order to make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII. 144
For instance, in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc., the Second Circuit—
the same Circuit that initially failed to find for Zarda on his sexual orientation
discrimination claim—found for a homosexual plaintiff employee on a sex
stereotyping theory just three weeks prior to the Zarda panel decision. 145 One
primary difference between Christiansen and Zarda is that Christiansen’s
complaint alleged multiple instances of sex stereotyping discrimination. 146
While the district court opined that permitting Christiansen’s Title VII claim to
proceed “would obliterate the line the Second Circuit has drawn, rightly or
wrongly, between sexual orientation and sex-based claims,” 147 the appellate
division concluded that “gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals do not have less
protection under Price Waterhouse against traditional gender stereotype
discrimination than do heterosexual individuals.” 148 In other words, LGBT+
employees are not automatically exempt from Title VII protections—even
outside of the Seventh and Second Circuits—so long as they can prove that acts

143. Rebecca Shafer, Big Victory for LGBT Rights: Hively v. Ivy Tech, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. (April 13, 2017), http://harvardcrcl.org/big-victory-for-lgbt-rights-hively-v-ivy-tech/
[https://perma.cc/HK6R-3Y26].
144. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989), remains the standard for sex
stereotyping claims under Title VII.
145. 852 F.3d 195, 200–01 (2d Cir. 2017).
146. Id. at 200.
147. Id. (quoting Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 598, 621 (S.D.N.Y.
2016)).
148. Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 200–01.
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of gender nonconformity are a substantial factor in their experiences of
employment discrimination.
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Katzmann (joined by Judge Brodie)
argued that “sexual orientation discrimination is often, if not always, motivated
by a desire to enforce heterosexually defined gender norms.” 149 The concurrence
stated that the current approach to sex stereotype claims is unworkable for
numerous district courts throughout the country. 150 This is because such cases
present fact-finders with the exceptionally difficult task of deciding whether a
plaintiff’s perceived masculinity/femininity or a plaintiff’s sexual orientation
was the true cause of the disparate treatment—a task made even more
challenging when considering the degree to which sexual orientation is
commingled with particular traits associated with gender. 151 The concurrence
urged the Second Circuit to reexamine its previous decisions holding that sexual
orientation discrimination claims are not cognizable under Title VII, 152 which it
ultimately did in the Zarda en banc opinion. 153 However, Judges Katzmann and
Brodie accept that it may be the Supreme Court that ultimately must address the
issue once and for all. 154
Apart from the gender nonconformity framing, employees are currently
afforded no protections outside of the Seventh and Second Circuits for sexual
orientation discrimination. As a result of Hively and Zarda, employees working
in the Seventh and Second Circuits are now afforded greater protections than
those working outside of those circuits. This is leading many to question exactly
how Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition should be interpreted and applied.
CORRECT INTERPRETATION
As the analysis to this point shows, the circuits are currently conflicted on
the interpretation of Title VII’s sex discrimination protections. The Eleventh
Circuit’s ruling for the employer in Evans is in direct conflict with the Seventh
Circuit’s Hively decision, the Second Circuit’s Zarda decision, and with the
EEOC Guidelines. Furthermore, the employer in Zarda has a pending certiorari
petition before the Supreme Court. 155 Altitude Express has urged the Supreme
Court to “address the growing uncertainty” stemming from both the circuit split
and the split between the EEOC and the Department of Justice. 156 In other
149. Id. at 195 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring) (quoting Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403,
410 (D. Mass. 2002)).
150. Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 205 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring).
151. Id. at 205–06.
152. Id. at 207.
153. Zarda v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100, 110 (2nd Cir. 2018) (en banc).
154. Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 207 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring).
155. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 (filed May 29,
2018).
156. Id. at 14, 31.
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words, the issue of Title VII protections for LGBT+ employees is ripe for
Supreme Court intervention. It is time that the Supreme Court rule on this issue
once and for all and call sexual orientation discrimination what it really is: sex
discrimination.
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION SHOULD BE PROTECTED UNDER
TITLE VII
The current split in the interpretation of Title VII’s application to sexual
orientation discrimination is confusing and inconsistent. There are several
reasons why the Supreme Court should resolve this ambiguity and rule that
sexual orientation discrimination is protected under Title VII. Namely, (1) it is
impossible to separate sexual orientation from gender nonconformity, (2) the
inclusion of sexual orientation discrimination will make the application of Title
VII clearer and easier for courts, (3) a failure to protect employees from sexual
orientation discrimination is confusing for employers, and (4) the current state
of the law is confusing for and unfair to employees.
1.

It is impossible to separate sexual orientation from gender
nonconformity.

First, it is patently impossible to separate sexual orientation from gender
nonconformity. The Supreme Court extended Title VII’s protections to cases of
gender nonconformity in 1989 in its Price Waterhouse decision. 157 Yet, three
decades later, sexual orientation is still not universally protected under the
statute despite the fact that it is greatly intertwined with gender nonconformity
and relies on the same underlying theory of Title VII protection. 158 In other
words, the fact that a plaintiff frames his or her complaint in terms of sexual
orientation discrimination instead of gender stereotyping discrimination is
“immaterial.” 159 Judge Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York stated
it best when he said:
[When a] plaintiff has stated a claim for sexual orientation discrimination,
“common sense” dictates that he has also stated a claim for gender stereotyping
discrimination, which is cognizable under Title VII. . . . I decline to embrace an
“illogical” and artificial distinction between gender stereotyping discrimination
and sexual orientation discrimination, and in so doing, I join several other courts
throughout the country. 160

Judge Hellerstein’s view is consistent with Judges Katzmann and Brodie in their
Christensen concurrence: “‘[S]tereotypical notions about how men and women
157. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989).
158. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(discussing the fact that homosexuality goes against the established norm of heterosexuality).
159. Philpott v. New York, 252 F. Supp. 3d 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
160. Id.
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should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and
homosexuality.’ . . . [I]t is logically untenable for us to insist that this particular
gender stereotype is outside of the gender stereotype discrimination prohibition
articulated in Price Waterhouse.” 161
Despite this reasoning, the same circuit came to a different conclusion just
weeks before in the Zarda panel decision when it concluded that Zarda failed to
establish the requisite proximity between his termination and his failure to
conform to gender stereotypes. 162 Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit overruled
the panel decision, finding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
is sex discrimination. 163 This further evidences the muddied waters between
purely sexual orientation claims and gender nonconformity claims and again
reaffirms the need to stop trying to draw a line where one does not exist. 164
Furthermore, an adoption of Hively’s interpretation of the cognizability of
sexual orientation claims under Title VII would eliminate the practice of finding
against an employee for “bootstrapping” their sexual orientation claims with sex
stereotype claims. This is precisely why Zarda was initially unsuccessful in
proving his discrimination claim—although he alleged both sexual orientation
discrimination and discrimination based on sex stereotyping, he failed to
effectively prove his case under a theory of sex stereotyping. 165 Theoretically, a
court could also go out of its way to focus narrowly on sexual orientation
stereotypes as opposed to sex stereotypes to avoid finding for the plaintiff on the
basis of sexual orientation discrimination. 166 Such may have been the case for
Zarda in his initial case, as he was described as having a “typically masculine
demeanor” despite being openly homosexual. 167 If sexual orientation
discrimination was covered under Title VII, plaintiffs like Zarda would have a
much better chance at proving their case. If heterosexual orientation is a sex
stereotype per se, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is literally
discrimination on the basis of sex. This means that LGBT+ plaintiffs would be
left to prove that they have experienced an adverse employment action because
of their sexual orientation (as opposed to another reason such as poor

161. Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 205 (2d Cir. 2017) (Katzmann, C.J.,
concurring) (quoting Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005)).
162. Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2017). Courts are also often thought
of as singular entities. However, cases such as Zarda are panel decisions with different judges, and
judges may simply disagree on this fundamental interpretation of failing to conform to sex
stereotypes.
163. Zarda v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100, 132 (2nd Cir. 2018) (en banc).
164. See Philpott, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 317.
165. Zarda, 855 F.3d at 81–82.
166. See Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525, 563–64 (discussing how
plaintiff’s harassment claims may fail if the purported harasser is the same sex as the purported
victim and does not appear to be stereotypically homosexual).
167. Zarda, 855 F.3d at 80–81.
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performance or failure to follow company policy) to receive protection under
Title VII’s sex discrimination provision. 168
The EEOC’s analysis (as applied in the Zarda en banc opinion) of the
immense overlap of the two concepts also demonstrates that sexual orientation
discrimination is sex discrimination. In Baldwin v. Foxx, the EEOC held that a
claim of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily states a
claim of discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII under three
theories. 169 First, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily
involves treating an employee differently because of his or her sex. 170 Second,
sexual orientation discrimination is associational discrimination. 171 The EEOC’s
third reason for concluding that sexual orientation discrimination is sex
discrimination echoes that of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hively—sexual
orientation discrimination necessarily involves discrimination based on gender
stereotypes, including employer beliefs about the person to whom the employee
should be attracted. 172 This is reminiscent of Chief Judge Wood’s statement in
Hively that the plaintiff represented the “ultimate” case of a failure to conform
to the female stereotype because she was not heterosexual. 173
2.

The inclusion of sexual orientation discrimination will make the
application of Title VII clearer and easier for courts.

Courts are currently split as to whether sexual orientation discrimination is
included under Title VII because it is unclear how the sex discrimination
provision should be interpreted. While some argue that it should only include
clear cases of sex discrimination and gender nonconformity, 174 others argue that
sexual orientation discrimination and gender nonconformity are essentially one
and the same. 175 Absent consistent protections for sexual orientation
discrimination, gay and lesbian employees would be forced to litigate their
claims under the guise of “gender nonconformity” to receive statutory

168. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (discussing the
plaintiff’s initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination).
169. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10 (July 15,
2015).
170. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 5. See supra note 135 and
accompanying text.
171. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 5. See supra note 140 and
accompanying text.
172. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 5.
173. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017).
174. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2017); Christiansen v. Omnicom
Grp., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 598, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
175. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 346; Philpott v. New York, 252 F. Supp. 3d 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y.
2017).
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protection. 176 That is, LGBT+ employees would need to demonstrate that they
experienced discrimination because of gender nonconformity in their
mannerisms, appearance, or behavior to receive statutory protection. 177
However, numerous district courts throughout the country have “found this
approach to gender stereotype claims to be unworkable.” 178 Instead of a
successful route to claiming Title VII protection, the result is a “contradictory”
and “confused hodgepodge of cases.” 179 In other words, the gender
nonconformity litigation approach does not work for plaintiffs, and it does not
work for courts.
Additionally, the existing protection for gender nonconformity claims under
Price Waterhouse is not always a workaround solution for LGBT+ employees.
Gender nonconformity claims are especially difficult for gay plaintiffs to
bring 180 and even harder for district courts to adjudicate. 181 This likely explains
why Zarda’s case has been litigated four times and now has a pending certiorari
petition before the Supreme Court. 182 As a result, “litigants and courts should
not be required to cram cases involving discrimination based on sexual
orientation into this box.” 183 Instead, they should have a more direct route to
achieving Title VII protection.
A finding that Title VII encompasses sexual orientation discrimination
claims, on the other hand, will take the guesswork out of the analysis. In other
words, courts would not have to determine whether a plaintiff’s sexual
orientation claim overlaps enough with gender nonconformity to warrant
protection because the standard simply would be that it does. Instead, courts
would be left to determine whether the discrimination claim meets the remaining
criteria of a Title VII sex discrimination claim 184 as opposed to grappling with
176. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18–19, Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 248 (11th
Cir. 2017) (No. 17-370).
177. Id. at 18.
178. Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., 852 F.3d 195, 205 (2d Cir. 2017) (Katzmann, C.J.,
concurring).
179. Hively, 853 F.3d at 342, 350.
180. Maroney v. Waterbury Hosp., No. 3:10–CV–1415 (JCH), 2011 WL 1085633, at *2 n.2
(D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2011).
181. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19, Evans, 850 F.3d 248 (No. 17-370).
182. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2018) (en banc); Zarda v. Altitude
Express, 855 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2017); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. CV-10-4334, 2015
WL 8547638 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2015); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Altitude Express Inc. v.
Zarda, No. 17-1623 (filed May 29, 2018).
183. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19, Evans, 850 F.3d 248 (No. 17-370).
184. A plaintiff can establish a Title VII claim under a theory of disparate treatment or disparate
impact. For disparate treatment, a plaintiff must create a presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against the employee, though the facts that must be proven to establish a prima facie
case vary somewhat. In general, a plaintiff must prove (1) that he or she is a member of a protected
class under Title VII (sex), (2) that the discriminatory act took place (e.g., refusal to hire, failure to
promote, sexual harassment, paid less), and (3) that the discrimination was because of sex. For
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whether the plaintiff is even a member of a protected class to begin with. A
finding consistent with Hively and Zarda would allow this question to be
answered more straightforwardly.
Additionally, the current confusion would not disappear if courts continue
to side with employers. The confusion lies not with the competing interpretations
of appellate circuits, but rather with the attempt to disentangle sex stereotypes
from sexual orientation stereotypes. This will only be resolved if the Supreme
Court rules that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination.
3.

A failure to protect employees from sexual orientation discrimination
is confusing for employers.

The current state of the law is also leaving employers unsure of their legal
obligations, 185 and this confusion will only be perpetuated if sex stereotyping is
kept distinct from sexual orientation because courts will continue to find
sometimes for employers and other times for employees, sometimes on nearly
identical facts. A company that has offices throughout the United States should
be able to advise management, train supervisors, and inform employees of their
rights in the same way, yet the current state of affairs precludes such clarity. 186
A finding that sexual orientation discrimination is not sex discrimination,
which would still leave open the opportunity to litigate claims under a gender
nonconformity theory of sex discrimination under Title VII, 187 would not clear
this blurred standard. Instead, this would essentially send the message to
employers that it is lawful to discriminate against an LGBT+ identifying
employee who conforms to their birth sex, but not an LGBT+ identifying
employee who exhibits obvious gender nonconformity. 188 Imagine the
implications on diversity training programs, which would come to suggest that
supervisors should exercise extra caution in making decisions regarding gender
nonconforming employees, but not employees who are known to identify as
LGBT+ but otherwise appear to conform to their birth sex.

disparate impact, the plaintiff must show (1) that the employer has a procedure or practice which
is a barrier to employment opportunities, (2) for member of a protected class (e.g., sex), and (3)
that barrier had an adverse impact on that protected class, originally set out in race-based
discrimination cases such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and Albermarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), and later applied to sex discrimination cases in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). See Susan M. Omiliam & Jean P. Kamp, 1 SEX-BASED EMP.
DISCRIMINATION § 11:10 (2018).
185. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Evans, 850 F.3d 248 (No. 17-370).
186. Id. at 16.
187. For instance, while an effeminate gay man will likely be protected under Title VII, a noneffeminate gay would probably not be. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–
51 (1989).
188. See Case, supra note 11, at 4.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

156

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:133

Alternatively, an extension of Title VII protections to LGBT+ identifying
employees would increase not only the law’s clarity, but also its predictability.
A finding that sexual orientation is protected under Title VII would allow
companies to function more consistently. It would allow companies to update
their workplace policies in recognition of Title VII protections of sexual
orientation and would better inform training programs targeted at inclusion and
fair treatment of all employees, regardless of their behaviors or preferences.
4.

A failure to protect employees from sexual orientation discrimination
is confusing for and unfair to employees.

A finding that sexual orientation discrimination is not sex discrimination
would not only leave employers confused, it would also leave employees in a
difficult position, forcing them to choose between protection or potential
discrimination. 189 The current state of sexual orientation discrimination law
leaves employees in a difficult position as to whether or not they can feel secure
in revealing their sexual orientation out of fear of discrimination or unfair
treatment. 190 In fact, in some states, LGBT+ employees can now legally get
married one day, and legally get fired the next. 191 Additionally, LGBT+
employees who are entitled to insurance and other forms of employment benefits
for their spouses might exercise caution in revealing their marital status to their
employer out of fear of revealing their sexual orientation and subjecting
themselves to termination on that basis. 192
In addition to facing a greater potential for termination, LGBT+ employees
are also typically paid less and have fewer employment opportunities than their
heterosexual coworkers. 193 LGBT+ employees, particularly those exposed to
discrimination, are also at risk for poorer physical and mental health—especially
in jurisdictions where sexual orientation stigma and economic disadvantages run
highest. 194 A decision from the Supreme Court clarifying that Title VII’s
prohibition of sex discrimination also encompasses sexual orientation
discrimination would ease the burdens associated with identifying as LGBT+.195
189. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Evans, 850 F.3d 248 (No. 17-370).
190. Id.
191. Gene Robinson, State of LGBT Rights: Married on Sunday, but Fired on Monday, DAILY
BEAST (Dec. 14, 2014, 6:45 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/state-of-lgbt-rights-married-onsunday-but-fired-on-monday [https://perma.cc/G94V-PTC5].
192. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Evans, 850 F.3d 248 (No. 17-370).
193. Brad Sears & Christ Mallory, Employment Discrimination Against LGBT People:
Existence and Impact, in GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE
WORKPLACE: A PRACTICE GUIDE ch. 40-13 (Christine Michelle Duffy ed., 2014).
194. Id. See also AMIRA HASENBUSH ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., THE LGBT DIVIDE: A DATA
PORTRAIT OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE MIDWESTERN, MOUNTAIN, AND SOUTHERN STATES 1, 1–7,
(2014),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-divide-Dec-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YY6R-B744].
195. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20, Evans, 850 F.3d 248 (No. 17-370).
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The law will only continue to be applied unfairly and inconsistently if the
Supreme Court finds that sexual orientation discrimination is distinct from sex
discrimination. Currently, some employees are eligible for Title VII protections,
while others are not, solely as a result of which jurisdiction’s law is applied in
their case. For instance, a gay person living in Michigan and working in
Michigan can be fired at any time based on his sexual orientation. 196 However,
if the gay person lives in Michigan and works in Indiana, he will enjoy greater
job security, as Indiana is within the Seventh Circuit that decided Hively. 197
Similarly, if an employee living in a Seventh or Second Circuit state has a
job opportunity or a promotion opportunity in a non-Seventh or non-Second
Circuit state, the employee would have to choose between advancing their career
while foregoing Title VII protection or remaining in their current position in the
protected jurisdiction. 198 Federal law should not put people in such a situation. 199
Furthermore, this issue will only be resolved if the Supreme Court agrees
with the Hively and Zarda decisions because plaintiffs will still be free to allege
sexual orientation discrimination under a gender stereotyping theory per Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 200 In other words, the law would ultimately protect gay
and lesbian employees who exhibit obvious gender nonconformity in their
mannerisms, appearance, and behavior, but not those who appear to conform to
their birth sex. 201 Conversely, “plaintiffs who do not look, act, or appear to be
gender nonconforming but are merely known to be or perceived to be gay or
lesbian do not fare as well in the federal courts.” 202 This was precisely the case
in Vickers, where the plaintiff was admonished for his perceived homosexuality,
but did not display enough gender nonconforming behaviors at work to
successfully claim Title VII protection. 203 Unfortunately, Vickers is not alone;
in one study, the plaintiff lost in thirty-five cases that involved only “cognized”
(i.e., “invisible”) gender nonconforming behaviors and only won in one case. 204
When contrasted with visible stereotypes, the plaintiff won twelve times and
only lost in three instances. 205 According to some scholars, the “ultimate gender
stereotype” is committed when homosexual employees are discriminated against
for failing to conform to gender expectations, and it is argued that both gender

196. Id. at 15.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989).
201. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Evans, 850 F.3d 248 (No. 17-370).
202. Id. (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 2016)).
203. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006).
204. Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L.R.
715, 748 tbl. 1 (2014).
205. Id.
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conforming and gender nonconforming individuals should be equalized under
Title VII. 206
As a result, if sexual orientation discrimination is not covered under Title
VII, plaintiffs would still likely experience different results depending on the
extent to which their LGBT+ status is gender nonconforming. This is especially
concerning given that identifying as LGBT+ in and of itself is already seen as
gender nonconforming 207 and given that acceptance of LGBT+ status in the U.S.
continues to vary by region. 208 LGBT+ employees – particularly those who are
not obviously gender nonconforming – may feel compelled to remain in
jurisdictions that are more receptive to a finding of gender nonconformity in
LGBT+ discrimination cases or risk facing adverse employment actions simply
as a result of their sexual orientation. A finding that sexual orientation
discrimination is covered under Title VII would be a notable first step in
circumventing these inevitably inconsistent applications of the law.
Also, a plaintiff’s ability to even bring a discrimination claim in the first
place rests largely on the information they provide to the EEOC or a state agency
at the outset of the complaint process. Sixty-two percent of the adult population
already thinks it is against federal law to discriminate against LGBT+
individuals in the workplace, 209 and the current state of the law demonstrates
that trained lawyers are not clear on the law either. If judges and lawyers are
confused, it is unlikely a lay employee will know how to frame the facts of their
discrimination claim when they file a charge with the EEOC or a state agency.
The partially automated intake process may not even provide the employee with
the requisite form if they do not answer the screening questions in a way that
clarifies that Title VII has been violated, 210 further encouraging the inconsistent
application of employment discrimination law by allowing some plaintiffs to
proceed to the next step of the complaint process while leaving others with
absolutely no recourse.
Unfortunately, the current legal landscape “sends a strong message that it is
acceptable to discriminate against employees based on their constitutionally
protected love for a person of the same sex.” 211 This contrasts with the primary

206. Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing GenderConforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L.R. 465, 465
(2004).
207. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 342, 346 (7th Cir. 2017).
208. HASENBUSH ET AL., supra note 194, at 5–7.
209. Moore, supra note 7.
210. See, e.g., Discrimination Complaint Assessment, MO. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS.
RELATIONS, http://apps.labor.mo.gov/mohumanrights/File_Complaint/assessment.asp [https://per
ma.cc/AA45-Z82B] (last visited Nov. 9, 2018).
211. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 248 (11th Cir.
2017) (No. 17-370).
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objective of Title VII: to avoid harm. 212 Furthermore, studies demonstrate that
workplace discrimination subsides when legal rules clearly prohibit it. 213 The
Supreme Court has the power to decide whether this country will continue to
send the message that discrimination against LGBT+ employees is okay.
CONCLUSION
While protections for the LGBT+ community are on the rise, employment
discrimination law continues to lag. The Supreme Court ruled three decades ago
that discrimination claims based on a theory of gender nonconformity are
protected under Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition. However, courts were
then left to determine whether sexual orientation discrimination should be
afforded the same protections under Title VII. This question has proven to be far
less clear, resulting in inconsistently applied law across the United States. If the
inconsistency persists, the Supreme Court should intervene and rule once and
for all that sexual orientation discrimination is protected under Title VII, since
there is always some level of gender nonconformity present in sexual orientation
discrimination cases. Courts should cease attempts to draw a distinction between
sexual orientation and gender nonconformity where no distinction logically
exists and should side with the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Seventh
Circuits in interpreting that sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited under
Title VII. This will result in a clearer standard, more consistently applied law,
and greater fairness for employees across the country.
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